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SOME ASPECTS OF MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY
W. L. Hoyt •
At common law the husband and wife were originally re­
garded as one person. With minor exceptions the wife was in­
capable of acquiring or holding property independantly from 
her husband. The history of the wife's separate property may 
be traced through a series of statutes culminating in our present 
Married Women’s Property Act. This process of independence 
was aided by the court of equity devising the equitable doctrine 
of a married woman’s separate estate.
At common law all freehold acquired by the wife came 
under the control of the husband who took the rents and profits 
and could alienate it subject to the right of a wife to recover it 
by a writ of entry from his alienees after his death. Of the wife’s 
chattels real, the husband had complete control as well as power 
of disposition except as to disposition by will during her lifetime. 
Of her tangible personalty he became the absolute owner and 
also of her choses in action if he succeeded in reducing them 
into possession. As the wife could not contract she could not 
convey. The only common law method of conveying the whole 
of a husband ana wife’s estate in lands was by ‘levying a fine” 
to which husband and wife were parties and to which she gave 
her assent after a separate examination.
Before the various Married Women’s Property Acts equity 
had devised an equitable estate for married women. It is diffi­
cult to say when the device was invented but it certainly was in 
use sometime before 1788. A married woman had always been 
able to act in “autre droit” for example to exercise a power of 
appointment or to act as agent. Developing this common law 
principle that a married woman acting in autre droit was as 
competent as a femme sole, the courts of equity brought into 
existence the equitable separate property for married women. 
By means of a settlement property was conveyed to trustees to 
hold for the sole and separate use of the wife, to pay the income 
for her, and to hold the property in trust for such persons as she 
might by deed or will appoint. In this way the property escaped 
the control of the husband and the liability for his debts. As a 
further safeguard from the persuasion of her husband equity also 
dervised a restraint upon anticipation which might be imposed 
under the terms of the setdement. Its effect was to prevent the 
wife from assigning her income or in any way charging it before 
it actually came into her possession.
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The first legislative attempt in New Brunswick to provide 
for separate property for married women occurred in 18511 when 
“an act to secure to married women real and personal property 
held in their own right”, was passed. This act was substantially 
re-enacted as Chapter 114 in the 1854 consolidation.2 It provided 
for two classes of cases having no reference either to the date of 
marriage or to the time when the property was acquired. The 
property of the married woman living with her husband was by 
force of that act exempted from all liability by reason of the 
husband’s debt and he could not convey, encumber or dispose 
of it without his wife’s consent. It was liable for her debts con­
tracted before marriage and for judgments recovered against her 
husband for her wrong. The woman who had been deserted or 
abandoned by her husband stood in an entirely different position. 
She could recover in her own name and for her own use for her 
services and for debts due her and for damages or injuries to 
herself or to her property. No change was made until 18693 
when the provisions of Chapter 114 of the consolidated statutes 
were made to apply to married women living separate and apart 
from their husoands, not wilfully and of their own accord 
(though they had not been abandoned or deserted). Additional 
provisions were made with a view to securing to wives thus 
separated from their husbands complete control and power of 
disposal over their own property. The husband was deprived 
from all interest in the wifes propery quite irrespective of the 
date at which it had been acquired or of the date of the desertion 
or separation.
The rights and liabilities of a married woman living with 
her husband with regard to her separate property as secured to 
her by the provisions of the 1876 consolidation were judicially 
determined by the case of Wallace v. Lea4 when the Supreme 
Court of Canada gave its approval to the dissenting judgment 
of Mr. Justice Hannigan. Her property could not be conveyed 
or encumbered by her husband without her consent, evidenced 
by her joining in the deed and acknowledging it. Her property 
was not liable for his debts, she was not given any power to 
contract or so as to bind herself or her property and she had not 
the power of disposal of her property except with the concur­
rence of her husband. This was the position until the Married 
Women’s Property Act of 18955 was passed.
1. (1851) 14 Viet., c. 24 N.B.
2. R.S.N.B. 1854, c:. 114.
3. (1869) 32 Viet., c. 33 N.B.
4. 28 S.C.R. 595.
5. (1895) 58 Viet., c. 24 N.B.
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It might be noted here that at this time England or Ontario 
had not legislated in this matter. The first Imperial act dealing 
with married women’s separate property was enacted in 1882.® 
This act, while it went further in many regards than our previous 
acts must be regarded, however, as being junior to our acts. 
Indeed this subject illustrates a generally held view that regard­
ing property this province at this time took second place to no 
other jurisdiction in either legislation or the interpretation 
placed on the law of property, particularly real property, by our 
courts.
It is to be regretted that legislation of the past generation 
has not kept pace with that of previous generations. The courts 
also have been somewhat less than bold in this respect and the 
recent lack of dissenting judgments does not augur well for the 
development of a vigorous jurisprudence in this province.
The 1895 Act can be considered to be the direct forerunner 
of our present act and the provisions of our present act can be 
largely found in this earlier act with the exception that restraint 
on anticipation was abolished by amendment after the 1895 Act. 
Without going into the individual secions of our present act it 
is sufficient to say that by virtue of this act subject to the 
exceptions noted below that there has grown up in this province 
a regime of separate property as between husband and wife.
The Act defined the property rights of a married woman, 
her right to sue and liability to be sued and discharged the hus­
band from certain liabilities for the acts of the wife with which 
he was burdened at common law.
Accordingly a regime of strict separation of property was 
established by the Married Womens Property Act and marriage 
no longer had any effect on the property rights of the spouse 
inter se. This principle, however, is subject in New Brunswick 
to four important exceptions, each of which deserves some com­
ment.
Firstly, a husband or wife cannot sue the other in tort unless 
for a tort committed while living apart under a decree or order 
for separation. The married woman is provided in section 6(1) 
with a right of action in her own name for the protection of her 
own separate property as if she were unmarried. Subject to the 
qualifications contained in section 6, no husband or wife shall 
be entitled to sue the other in tort.
In Curtis v. Wilcox,7 the English Court of Appeal had to 
decide Whether or not a marrried woman could maintain an
6. The Married Women’s Property Act, (1882) 45 & 46 Viet., 
c. 75.
7. [1948] 2 All E.R. 573.
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action in tort against a person who now was her husband. The 
cause of action, a motor vehicle accident, arose before the parties 
were married. The court below regarded itself bound by the 
decision in Gottliffe v. Edelston,8 and dismissed the action. The 
Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, decided that the action 
could be brought. Wynn-Parry, J. at p. 576 said:
“Section 24 (the definition clause) says: “The word 
‘property’ in this Act includes a thing in action.”
The effect of s. 2, the language cf which is unambiguous, 
is that in her separate properly there is or can be in­
cluded without exception all the real and personal prop­
erty which belongs to her at the time of the marriage, 
while the definition of property in s. 24 makes it clear 
beyond doubt that, as the language of s. 2 itself indicates, 
her personal property includes her things in action. 
Under s. 12 the right of suing which is given to a married  
woman extends, so far as concerns what may be the sub- 
ject-m atter of the action, to all her property. The limita­
tion which is imposed by the section is not on the kind of 
property which may be the subject of an action by her, 
but only on the purpose for which the action may be 
brought; it must be for the protection or security of her 
property. It follows, in our judgment, that there is no 
ground to be discovered in the language of the relevant 
sections of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, for 
holding that “thing in action” is used in that Act in any 
limited sense. In our judgment, therefore, Gottliffe v. 
Edelston (1) was wrongly decided and is not good law .”
Section (1) (h) of the New Brunswick Married Woman’s 
Property Act defines “property” as including a thing in action. 
This definition, together with sections 3 and 6, would make the 
decision in Curtis v. Wilcox applicable in New Brunswick. It is 
suggested, however, that the curious remarks of Wynn-Parry, J. 
at p. 576 where he distinguished a purely personal claim against 
her husband, e.g., for libel or slander or assault which would be 
barred, from a claim for personal injuries arising from negligence 
are merely obiter and would not apply in New Brunswick.
In Baylis v. Blackwell et al,9 the court was urged that the 
unity of husband and wife had been broken down by the passage 
of time. The court faced with Lord Sumner’s observations in 
Edwards v. Porter10 that the Act was a Married Women’s Prop­
erty Act and not a married man’s relief act and the statutory 
provision, contained in s. 12 of the Married Women’s Property 
Act, and reaffirmed by the Law Reform (Married Women and 
Tortfeasors) Act, 1935 could not agree and held that a husband 
could not maintain an action against his wife for an ante-nuptial 
tort. At p. 77 McNair, J. said:
8. [1930] 2 K.B. 378
9. [1952J 1 All E.R. 74.
10. [1925] A.C. 1 at 38.
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“It may be anomalous that in these days of equity the 
wife should be able to sue the husband for ante-nuptial 
torts and possibly for torts during coverture while the 
husband should not enjoy corresponding rights. This 
anomaly, if anomaly it be, is, in my judgment, so firmly 
engrafted in our law that it can only rightly be removed 
by legislation.’•
It is suggested that s. 6(3) of the New Brunswick Married 
Women’s Property Act could prevent the above mentioned de­
cision from being followed in New Brunswick.
The great anomoly in the law, although somewhat less in 
New Brunswick than in other jurisdictions, is the prohibition of 
actions in tort between husband and wife living together. While 
probably it was not the intention of the legislation, if the de­
cision in Curtis v. Wilcox,11 is good law, and it is submitted it 
is, then s. 6(1) and (3) of the Married Women's Property Act gives 
almost unrestricted remedies to husband and wife against each 
other if they live apart under an order of judicial separation for 
a tort committed during the separation. However, this right is 
of limited practical application in New Brunswick because of 
the limited number or judicial separations granted in New 
Brunswick.
It is suggested that the rule prohibiting actions between 
husband and wife for torts committed while living together no 
longer serves its original purpose, namely, of preserving do­
mestic amity. If a wife can go to the magistrate and lay a 
charge of assault, why should she not be able to maintain an 
action in tort arising from the same incident. Similarly, if ac­
tions in contract are allowed between husband and wife, why 
not in tort?
The present rule now benefits insurance companies and 
works to disadvantage of a concurrent tortfeasor. If a father 
can be sued by his child, for example, for negligence arising out 
of his operation of a motor vehicle, why should he not be sued 
by his spouse? Obviously in present day situations the insurers 
are able to obtain the benefit and spouses suffer the disadvan­
tage of a rule devised for use generations ago.12 A concurrent 
tortfeasor also is put to disadvantage by the rule which prevents 
him, when sued by a wife, from a right of contribution from a 
husband who is partially at fault.
11. [1948] 2 All E.R. 573.
12. See Wright, The Adequacy of the Law  of Torts, 1961 C .L .J. 
44 at p. 60 where he says “Accepting the validity of the doc­
trine that a wife cannot sue her husband in tort (a doctrine 
impossible to justify if the defendant is no longer really her 
husband but an insurance company) . . .”
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While there are many more obvious areas for law reform 
in New Brunswick, this matter could well receive attention, 
with, of course, the knowledge that certain interests would 
oppose such a change.
Secondly, special rules have been developed by the courts 
with regard to the matrimonial home.13
The matrimonial home is frequently the main and only 
substantial asset of a husband and wife and if the m ar­
riage should break down a bitter dispute over the bene­
ficial ownership and the right of occupation of the home 
often follows in its train . . .  It may be necessary to trace  
the financial history of the patries from the time they  
were married, to try to find where the money used to 
buy the home came from and why the conveyance was 
taken in the particular form it was . . . W here the funds 
of both parties have gone into the house it may make a 
great difference whether a particular spouse is entitled  
to a share in the home or merely to a charge on it for the 
money put up. Even when these difficulties are resolved, 
the right to occupation presents a separate problem.^
(i) Title. As the legal title only provides prima facie evidence 
as to the beneficial ownership various situations must be con­
sidered.
Until very recently the most common situation was where 
the conveyance is in the husband’s name, that is, where the legal 
title is vested in him. If the husband provided the purchase 
money he will be the beneficial owner unless the wife can 
prove that he holds it on trust for her and for this written evi­
dence will be required. If the wife provided the purchase 
money a presumption of a resulting trust in her favour arises for 
equity presumes that where the property is paid for by one 
person and the conveyance is taken in the name of another, the 
other is intended to hold the property so acquired on trust for 
the person providing the purcnase money.15 The presumption 
may be rebutted by showing that a gift was intended but if it 
is to be rebutted it must be done by evidence of statements or 
conduct at the time of purchase. Statements made or actions 
done by a person after the purchase are only evidence against 
the party making or doing them.16 If the presumption of a 
resulting trust is rebutted then a gift by the wife to the husband
13. The treatm ent of the topic of the matrimonial home follows 
somewhat the treatm ent of the same subject by E. J . Johnson  
in his work Fam ily Law  at pp. 92 and following, as modified 
by Canadian statute and decisions.
14. Edward F. George, “Disputes over the Matrimonial Home”, 
1952, 16 Conveyance and Property Laws 27.
15. Dyer v. Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq. 92.
16. See Phipson on Evidence, 19th ed., pp. 690-1.
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’ took place. The relationship of husband and wife is not such 
that in a case of a gift by a wife to the husband undue influence 
should be presumed17 although the gift may be set aside for 
undue influence if it is proved in fact. But a gift made by a 
woman to a man she intends to marry is presumed to have been 
made under undue influence.18
Less common is the situation where the conveyance is in the 
wife’s name. If the wife provided the purchase money she is 
beneficially entitled. If the husband provided the whole of the 
purchase money the presumption in favour of a resulting trust 
gives way to the presumption in favour of advancement, that is, 
the husband is presumed to have intended it as a gift to her and 
so in this case too she will be beneficially entitled.19 The pre­
sumption can be rebutted by oral testimony of acts or declar­
ations made before or at the time of purchase or by statements 
or acts afterwards against the interest of the party now claiming. 
It cannot, however, be rebutted by showing a fraudulent intent 
for he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. The 
presumption in favour of advancement is not rebutted by the 
fact that the husband paid mortgage interest for the presump­
tion in favour of advancement will apply to these payments 
also.20
There is no presumption of advancement where the husband 
merely joins as a surety in a mortgage effected by his wife. If 
the husband is called on to pay, it is as a result of a legal obli­
gation arising from the guarantee; there is no question of making 
a gift and so no presumption of advancement, and on payment 
the husband becomes entided, as against his wife, to the ordinary 
remedies of a surety who has paid his principal’s debt.
A common situation is where the cortveyance is in joint 
names. If the wife provides the purchase money the resulting 
trust is presumed in her favour, mat is, she is beneficially en­
titled. If the husband provides the purchase money the pre­
sumption of advancement applies to a beneficial interest in the 
joint tenancy, that is, the husband and wife are jointly entitled 
in equity as well in law.
An infrequent, but complicated situation arises when both 
parties provide money for the purchase price. The Supreme
17. Howes v. Bishop [1909] 2 K .B. 390.
18. Re Lloyd's Bank Ltd. [1931] 1 Ch. 289.
19. Mercier v. Mercier [1903] 2 Ch. 98.
20. Dunbar v. Dunbar [1909] 2 Ch. 639.
21. Anson v. Anson [1953] 1 Q.B. 636.
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Court of Canada in Thompson v. Thompson22 recently consider­
ed the problems which arise in this situation. A series of recent 
English decisions23 which adopt Lord Justice Denning’s dissent 
in Hoddintot v. Hoddintot24 enable the English wife to become 
the owner of a one-half interest in the matrimonial home if it is 
found that she makes any contributions to its purchase. In 
Thompson v. Thompson the trial judge found that no contribu­
tion had been made by the wife to the purchaser of the home. 
The Court of Appeal made an independent finding of a contri­
bution by the wife, applied the above English decisions, and 
found for the wife. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada 
felt that the trial judge’s findings of fact should not have been 
disturbed and allowed the appeal. But the court did not ex­
pressly disapprove of the above-cited English decisions and, in 
fact, tacitly approved an extension to the English view when 
Judson, J .2® said:
B ut no case has yet held that, in the absence of some 
financial contribution, the wife is entitled to a propri­
etary interest from the mere fact of m arriage and cohabi­
tation and the fact the property in question is the m atri­
monial home. Yet. if the principle is sound when it is 
based on a financial contribution, no m atter how modest, 
there seems to be no logical objection to its application 
and the exercise of the same discretion when there is no 
financial contribution when the other attributes of the 
matrimonial partnership are present. However, if one 
accepts the finding of the learned trial judge, the basis 
for the application of the rules at its present stage of 
development in England is not to be found in the present 
case
However, this bold statement, which, it is submitted, con­
stitutes the ratio decidendi of the decision it is somewhat diluted 
by the following obiter dicta:26
The judicial use of the discretionary power under s. 12 
of The Married Women's Property Act, R.S.O. 1950, c.
233, in property disputes between husband and wife has 
not developed in the same way in the comman law prov­
inces of Canada as it has in England. There is no hint 
of it in this Court in Minaker v. Minaker,2? and there is
22. [1961] S.C.R. 1.
23. Rimmer v. Rimmer [1952] 2 All E.R. 863. 
Cobb v. Cobb [1955] 2 All E.R. 696.
Silver v. Silver [1958] 1 All E.R. 523. 
Richards ▼. Richards [1958] 3 All E.R. 513. 
Fribance v. Fribance [1957] 1 All E.R. 357.
24. [1949] 2 K .B. 406
25. pp. 13-4.
26. p. 14.
27. [1949] 1 D.L.R. 801.
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an implicit rejection of the existence of any such power 
in Carnochan v . C a r n o c h a n ,-8 v here Cartwright, J . stated 
that the problem was not one of the exercise of a dis­
cretionary power but one of application of the law to 
ascertained facts. Further, in Jackman ▼. J a c k m a n ,29 
where the Alberta Court of Appeal in reversing the judg­
ment at trial, had applied the line of decisions above re­
ferred to, this Court declined to support the exercise of 
the discretionary power in the rebuttal of the presump­
tion of advancement in circumstances where the hus­
band’s contribution was very large and where it should 
not have been difficult to draw an inference of a joint 
interest in the matrimonial home.
If a presumption of joint assets is to be built up in these 
matrimonial cases, it seems to me that the better course 
would be to attain this object by legislation rather than 
by the exercise of an immeasurable judicial discretion 
under s. 12 of The Married Women's Property Act.
The right to reside in the matrimonial home presents no 
problems as long as consortium exists between husband and 
wife. The wife's right to reside there seems to halve been based 
in part on the husband’s liability to support her and partly on 
his inability to sue her in tort. However, it now appears that 
her right is an established maritial law and is reciprocal in that 
when the wife owns the matrimonial home the husband has an 
equal right to reside there.
A series of modem English cases establish the principal that 
if the husband has deserted the wife she is entitled to continue 
to reside in the matrimonial home even though title is in the 
husband. Her right to do so is as against him analogous to an 
irrevocable contractual license and can onlyl be lost either by 
her misconduct or by order of the court. The wife’s right can 
be protected by an order restraining the husband from entering 
into any contract for sale of the house until suitable alternative 
accomodation has been provided for the wife.
But what is the situation where the husband sells without 
making this arrangement and the wife fails to act quickly in 
protecting her rights? What is the position of a subsequent pur­
chaser?
The deserted wife’s right will prevail as against the pur­
chaser from the husband where the same is merely collusive, 
that is, where a purchaser buys with full knowledge of the facts. 
But in Jess B. Woodcock v. Hobbs,30 Parker, L. J. felt it would 
not prevail against a bona fide purchaser with or without notice, 
other cases being distinguishable on the grounds that the pur­
chaser did not act in good faith.
28. [1955] 4 D.L.R. 81.
29. 19 D.L.R. (2d) 317.
30. [1955] 1 All E.R. 445.
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A mortgagee seems to be in the same position as a purchaser 
but in Westminster Bank v. Lee31 the desertion occurred before 
an equitable mortgage was placed on the land. Here, as there 
was no notice either actual or constructive of the wife’s equity, 
the mortgagee was held entitled and not the wife. The learned 
Judge suggested that a purchasr will be affected by constructive 
notice of the wife’s right if he has notice of any fact which may 
or should have put him on further inquiry whether the husband 
has deserted the wife or if he has some suspicion he obtains 
from further inquiry but the mere fact of the wife’s possession 
will not effect the purchaser with constructive notice. It follows 
that these remarks apply while applying to a mortgagee, apply 
equally to a purchaser.
The important practical consideration in New Brunswick is 
of course that the wife must release her dower interest and 
therefore could in most instances prevent a sale. But does the 
wife in joining in a deed or releasing her dower right defeat her 
right to reside in the matrimonial home? If, of course, dower 
is abolished in New Brunswick, the problem will become much 
more urgent.
The third exception to the doctrine of separate property is 
that special procedure under section 7 of the Married Women’s 
Property Act has been devised for settling disputes between 
husband and wife concerning the ownership and possession of 
property. Any question of title to or possession or property as 
between husband and wife is determined by summary applica­
tion to a Judge of the Supreme Court sitting in the Chancery 
Division. The application can be made by the husband or wife 
or any corporation, company, public body or society in whose 
books and stocks, funds or shares of either party are standing.
The judge before whom such an application comes has a wide 
discretion32 although that discretion must be exercised judicially. 
Indeed the obiter dicta of Judson, J. cited above33 would appear 
to fly in the face of the statute. Lord Justice Romer’s remarks 
in Rimmer v. Rimmer34 where he said:
“ . . . cases between husband and wife are not to be 
governed by the same strict considerations both at law 
or in equity as ax'e commonly applied to the ascertain­
ment of the respective rights of strangers when each of 
them contributes to the parchase price of property.”
would appear to be the better view of the matter.
31. [1955] 2 All E.R. 883.
32. Married W om ens Property A ct R.S.N.B., c. 140, s. 7(1) 
“ . . . the judge may make such orders with respect to the 
property in dispute . . .  as he thinks fit . . .”
33. [1961] S.C.R. 1 at p. 14.
34. [1953] 1 Q.B. 63.
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It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Minaker v. Minaker35 made it clear that where the issue 
between husband and wife comes under this section an ordinary 
action in the court is barred.
The fourth exception is that in certain cases a presumption 
of advancement will rebut the presumption in favour of a re­
sulting trust which normally arises when a person buys property 
which is put in another’s name. It is not necessary to develop 
this exception further except to say that it has been illustrated 
in die above discussion on the matrimonial home and may be 
further extended to other property such as stocks and shares, 
bank accounts, and other personal property.
It goes without saying that New Brunswick lawyers have 
not utilized the above principles to their fullest extent, particu­
larly the problems relating to the matrimonial home and the 
special procedure under section 7 of the Married Women’s 
Property Act. It is to be hoped that the New Brunswick courts 
will be successfully urged to follow the more flexible English 
approach to a situation which will, in future, become much 
more common.
35. [1949] 1 D.L.R. 801.
